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People v. Henriquez'
(decided October 19, 2004)
After providing detailed written and videotaped statements
documenting the murder of his girlfriend, defendant Michael
Henriquez was charged with "intentional murder in the second
degree, illegal weapon possession and endangering the welfare of a
child."'

He was afforded a trial by jury and was subsequently

convicted of intentional murder in the second degree along with
other related crimes.'

Prior to the presentation of opening

statements at trial, Henriquez demanded that his assigned defense
counsel remain silent throughout the proceedings, and that he
4
refrain from participating or mounting any defense on his behalf.

Yet, Henriquez also indicated to the court that he did not wish to
proceed pro se.'

The trial judge warned Henriquez of the risks

inherent in such conduct and instructed defense counsel to remain
available during the trial "in the event defendant changed his mind
and decided to consult with him or present a defense."6
In upholding the conviction, the Appellate Division
"conclud[ed] that [Henriquez], after being consistently warned...
about the pitfalls of his conduct, knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived his rights to present a defense, cross-examine or

'818 N.E.2d 1125 (N.Y. 2004).

2Id at 1126.
31d. at 1127.
4 Id.
at 1126.
5

6

1d.
Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1126.
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Henriquez then

appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right' to effective assistance of counsel.9 He
argued that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when
the trial court and defense counsel respected his wishes and
allowed the prosecution to build its case against him, unchallenged
by any defense.' ° The argument was "premised on [Henriquez's]
claim that he neither waived nor forfeited his Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel.""

The Court of

Appeals refused to entertain Henriquez's Sixth Amendment claim
and held that both federal and state precedent lead to the
conclusion that defendants who restrict the participation of counsel
can, by such actions, voluntarily waive their right to the effective
assistance of counsel.

2

The court reiterated the message set forth

by the Appellate Division in People v. Kelly that "[t]here comes a
point where a defendant must bear the consequences of his
conduct, in a courtroom as well as out of it."' 3

'Id. at 1127.
8

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states in pertinent part: "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .

.

. have the Assistance of

Counsel for his defence."
9 Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1127.
10 Id.
" Id. It was Henriquez's contention that his attorney was "ethically obligated
to mount a defense" and that the trial court infringed upon his right to effective
assistance by allowing his counsel to remain silent during the proceedings. Id.
at 1127-28.
12 Id. at 1129 (citing United States ex rel. Testamark v. Vincent,
496 F.2d 641,
643-44 (2d Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly, 400 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84-85 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977)).
"sId. (citing Kelly, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 85).
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/10
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In March 1994, Henriquez informed authorities that he had
killed his girlfriend and that the body was left at his residence.' 4
He voluntarily approached a police car and told the officer about
the crime he had committed. 5 When police officers arrived at his
residence they found the victim dead from numerous gunshot
wounds to the head. 6 Henriquez was taken to the police station
where he "provided detailed written and videotaped statements in
which he confessed to shooting his girlfriend multiple times in the
presence of their infant daughter."' 7 He stated that he had found
the victim in a compromising position with another man and, in
reaction, he shot her numerous times, resulting in her death."
Henriquez was charged with intentional murder in the
second degree, illegal weapon possession and endangering the
welfare of a child.'9 He was assigned counsel and, prior to trial,
the judge conducted Huntley" and Sandoval2 hearings.22

His

14Henriquez, 818

N.E.2d at 1126. It is unclear from the decision whether the
victim was the defendant's wife or whether she was his girlfriend; Judge
Graffeo, writing for the majority, referred to her as the defendant's "paramour,"
while Judge Smith referred to her as the defendant's wife in his dissent.
15 1d
16id.
17 id.
18 Id.at 1130 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
19Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1126.
20 Pursuant to People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179, 183 (N.Y.1965), criminal
defendants are entitled to pretrial hearings in which the presiding judges are to
make express findings as to the voluntariness of alleged confessions prior to
admission of the confession to the jury.
21 Pursuant to People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413, 416-17
(N.Y. 1974), trial
judges in criminal cases may make advance rulings, upon a motion or by an
appropriate evidentiary hearing, concerning the scope of cross-examination as to
prior conduct to which the defendant will be subjected if he chooses to take the
witness stand.
22 Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1126.
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
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defense counsel participated in both the pretrial hearings and jury
selection, both without objection from Henriquez.23

However,

prior to the presentation of opening statements, defense counsel
informed the judge that Henriquez had instructed him to remain
silent during the trial and to refrain from mounting a defense on his
behalf.24

Specifically, Henriquez directed his attorney "not to

cross-examine any witnesses, not to object to any line of
questioning, not to... approach the bench, not to participate in any
bench conferences or side bars, not to have any defense in th[e]
case, not to call any witnesses, not to sum up, not to do
anything."25 In response to Henriquez's orders, defense counsel
asked to be relieved of his assignment and pleaded with the judge
to permit Henriquez to proceed pro se. 26

Henriquez, however,

stated to the court that he did not want to proceed pro se; rather, he
simply wanted his attorney to remain silent and refrain from doing
anything on his behalf during the trial. 27

The trial judge told

Henriquez that he did not have to proceed pro se and punctiliously
stressed that he was " 'foolishly' waiving many very important
rights' " by commanding his attorney to refrain from mounting a
defense.2' The Court of Appeals noted:

Faced with defendant's obstinancy [sic] in rejecting
his attorney's participation while refusing to
23

Id. Defense counsel was able to secure the suppression of a statement by the

defendant based on the prosecution's failure to provide notice pursuant to
Criminal Procedure Law 710.30. Id.
24 id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27

Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1126.

28 Id.
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proceed pro se, the court denied defense counsel's
application to withdraw and instructed him to
remain available during the proceedings in the event
defendant changed his mind and decided to consult
with him or present a defense.29
The trial court repeatedly explained to Henriquez that he

was free to change his mind at any time and urged him to allow his
attorney to participate in the trial." Henriquez convinced the judge
that he understood his options, but remained steadfast in his
decision to forgo a defense.3
As a result of Henriquez's persistence to avoid any defense
on

his

behalf, the

prosecution's

case against him

went

unchallenged. The People introduced four witnesses, all of who
testified without being subject to cross-examination.

2

The defense

did not make an opening statement, call any witnesses, file any
motions or raise any affirmative defenses.33

The court even

advised the defendant of the potential affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance, however, he summarily refused to
comment on any jury instruction.34 Lastly, the defense did not
present a summation and voiced no objections to the instructions
given by the court.35 Henriquez was subsequently convicted of
intentional murder in the second degree and other related crimes.36
29

Id.

3Id. at 1127.
31 id
32

Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1127.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 id.
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Criminal defendants are protected by their constitutional
guarantee to due process of law and "the fundamental right to a fair
trial" as evinced by the Due Process Clauses and the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.37 "In a long line of
cases . . . th[e] [Supreme] Court has recognized that the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial."3

Thus, an accused

who wishes to have the assistance of counsel cannot be forced to
stand trial unassisted by adequate legal representation.

9

On the

other hand, this right is "given directly to the accused" such that
the Constitution cannot "'force a lawyer upon a defendant."4

"An

accused awaiting trial therefore has only two choices regarding
legal representation - proceed with counsel or waive the protection
of the Sixth Amendment and proceed pro se." 4 '
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, a criminal defendant must satisfy two requirements in
order to state a cause of action for ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Federal Constitution.42 First, the defendant must show

31

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). "The Constitution

guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic
elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment....
" Id.
3
1 ld. at 684.
39 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). "[A]ny person haled into
court... cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id.

40 Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1128 (quoting Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806,
819-20 (1975); Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)).

41id
42

Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
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that there was a deficiency in counsel's performance.43

"This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment."" .Second, the defendant is required to
"show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."45 In
order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show
that the errors made by counsel were "so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial."46

In cases where the defendant has

hindered the performance of defense counsel and refused to
proceed pro se, federal courts are reluctant to find counsels'
performance either deficient or prejudicial.47 Rather, courts faced
with such obstinance tend to treat such action as a waiver of the
defendants' rights.4"

In United States ex. rel. Testamark v.

Vincent, the defendant was tried and convicted for the robbery,
inter alia, of a liquor store.49 The defendant "spumed... repeated
opportunities to represent himself or to be represented by
counsel." 5

The court held that the defendant's "refusal to

participate in the trial or confer with counsel were of his own
choosing" and that his "actions at trial constituted a waiver of his
right to counsel."'"
43 Id.

44id
45 Id.

Id.
See generally, United States ex rel. Testamark v. Vincent, 496 F.2d 641,
643-44
(2d Cir. 1974).
4
1Id.at 643.
49
1d. at 642.
5
0Id.at 644.
"' Id. at 643-44.
46

47
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Although similar, the requirements for stating a cause of
action for ineffective assistance of counsel under New York law
are less restrictive; New York afturds criminal defendants greater
protection than the Sixth Amendment.12

The constitutional

requirements for effective assistance of counsel are met in New
York as long as the defense attorney provides "meaningful
representation.

In People v. Baldi, the New York Court of

Appeals announced that "[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and
the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of
the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided
meaningful

representation, the constitutional requirement

[for

effective assistance of counsel] will have been met."54 The main
difference between the federal and state standards is that New
York does not strictly require that the defendant prove prejudice.5
Pursuant to New York law, a defendant's showing of prejudice is
significant, but it is not a dispositive element in assessing
meaningful representation.

6

Regardless of the subtle differences between the standards,
New York courts tend to treat defendants who have refused selfrepresentation and restricted the participation of counsel in the

52 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, which states in pertinent part, "In any trial in any

court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and' defend in
person and with counsel...."
53 People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 833, 887 (N.Y. 2004) (citing People v. Baldi,
429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981)).
m Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
5 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 887.
5 id
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/10
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same manner as their federal counterparts.

7

In People v. Kelly, the

New York Court of Appeals upheld an Appellate Division
determination that the defendant's Sixth Amendment claims were
unfounded and that the defendant "should not be permitted to
nullify a trial .

.

. by the simple expedient of obstructing every

effort of the court to assure to the defendant his legal rights and a
fair trial."58 Similar to the case at bar, the defendant in Kelly
refused to allow his attorney to participate in the proceedings. 9
The court's attempts "to ascertain whether defendant wanted to be
represented by counsel or whether to appear pro se were met by
unresponsive statements that [he] would be judged by Allah and
that Allah would advise him."

The court, after making every

attempt to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial, held that
the defendant was not deprived of his right to be represented by
counsel and that "[t]here comes a point where a defendant must
bear the consequences of his conduct."'" Similarly, the Court of
Appeals in Henriquez reaffirmed the sentiment which emanated
from the decision in Kelly, namely, that a defendant who
intelligently, knowingly and purposefully makes a decision,
regardless of how unwise it may turn out to be, must accept the
decision and the consequences of his actions.62 Thus, Henriquez's
conduct "translates into an intentional failure to avail himself of his
Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1129.
376 N.E.2d 931, 931 (N.Y. 1978); Kelly, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
59
Kelly, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
57
58

60 id.
61

Id. at 85.

62

Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1129.
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constitutional 'right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations.'

"63

In a dissenting opinion, Judge G.B. Smith entertained the
arguments made by Henriquez which threatened the integrity and
probity of our judicial system.

Judge Smith asserted that

Henriquez was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and
consequently a fair trial, because the trial was devoid of the
adversarial element.64

He argued that the trial judge incorrectly

accorded to the defendant the right to make strategic and tactical
decisions which resulted in a trial that failed to "ensure that the
adversarial testing process worked to produce a fair and just
result.

65

It was his contention that, by consenting to be

represented by counsel at the outset of the litigation, criminal
defendants relinquish the right to make strategic and tactical
decisions.66 Judge Smith relied on the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function Section 4-5.2
entitled "Control and Direction of the Case.

67

Specifically, the

defendant in criminal cases should be limited to making decisions
regarding what pleas to enter; whether to accept a plea agreement;
whether to waive a jury trial; whether to testify in his or her own
behalf; and whether to appeal, while defense counsel is entrusted

Id. at 1130 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,294 (1973)).
64Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
63

65

id

at 1136.
A STANDARD, DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2 (3d ed 1993).

66Id.
67

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/10
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to make "strategic and tactical decisions.., after consultation with
the client where feasible and appropriate."68
Judge Smith continued by setting forth the requirements for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under both federal and
New York law.69

He reiterated that although similar, the

requirements for making out a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel are not the same.7" Regardless, according to Judge Smith,
the assistance of counsel now under consideration ought to have
failed under either test since defense counsel did not render any
assistance.7

He asserted that "[a]s defendant exercised control

over defense counsel, the trial devolved into a non-adversarial
proceeding that, under the Federal and New York Constitutions,
was presumptively unfair because defense counsel failed to subject
the People's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

'

Yet, the majority held that the defendant attempted to abuse
the process by refusing to allow his counsel to effectively represent
him while simultaneously rejecting self-representation.73 In similar
cases, many courts have refused to allow such abuse and
degradation of the judicial system and have held that these
defendants voluntarily waive the right to effective assistance of
counsel.74
68

id.

69 Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1138 (Smith, J., dissenting).
70 id
71

Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1140.
73
Id. at 1128.
72

Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d at 1129 (citing United States ex rel. Testamark v.
Vincent, 496 F.2d 641, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1974)).
74
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In conclusion, it is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to Assistance of Counsel is
not violated by' allowing a trial to proceed after the defendant has
openly instructed his assigned counsel not to participate in his
defense and where defendant has declined to represent himself.
Defendants must accept the decisions they knowingly. intelligently
and voluntarily make and the consequences that result from such
actions. 75

Nicholas Melillo

75 Id.
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